University of South Carolina

Scholar Commons
Senior Theses

Honors College

Spring 2021

The Lintheads' Demise: A Study in Economic Dependency for the
Piedmont Region of South Carolina
Jeremy Lewis Ward
University of South Carolina - Columbia

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/senior_theses
Part of the Regional Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Ward, Jeremy Lewis, "The Lintheads' Demise: A Study in Economic Dependency for the Piedmont Region
of South Carolina" (2021). Senior Theses. 403.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/senior_theses/403

This Thesis is brought to you by the Honors College at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Senior Theses by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact
digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

1
Table of Contents

Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………….………2
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………..………3
Historical Overview…………………………………………………………………………...……5
Analysis of South Carolina Piedmont Counties……………………………………………………37
Hypothesis…………………………………………………………………………………...……49
Data………………………………………………………………………………………………49
Method……………………………………………………………………………………………57
Results……………………………………………………………………………………….……58
Analysis……………………………………………………………………………………...……62
Economic Development Strategies…………………………………………..………...…….……64
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………….………71
Bibliography………………………………………………………………………...……………74

2
Abstract
The decline of the Southern textile and apparel industries represent a unique and rich case
study in rapid economic change. It is unique because of the speed and uniformity of collapse; rich,
because of the geographic differences that exist even within the concentrated Piedmont textile
cluster. Truly, globalization has hit this economic cluster with a brutal punch. And yet, not all cities
and counties within the region have been equally harmed by the change.
This report concentrates on examining the socioeconomic variations that have taken place in
the thirteen foremost textile-producing counties in South Carolina since the collapse, as well as a
sample dataset of forty-seven other Southern counties. The history of the industry is briefly traced in
order to provide a background for the historical assumptions made in the analysis. A defined set of
indicator factors are then compiled into an economic vigor score for each county, tracking both
their socioeconomic change since the apogee of the textile industry and their current situation. This
score is then regressed against their job dependency on the industry in 1960. The results indicate that
historical hyper-dependency on textiles has no bearing on the health of Southern Piedmont counties,
although a strong correlation does exist for the South Carolina data. Three factors are identified as
having a positive effect on the changing industrial environment of counties, both urban and rural:
distance from a regional metropolis, population, and a concerted effort at economic diversification.
Relative economic performance of these counties has thus been lopsided, often depending on these
three factors, providing both a warning and encouragement for economic development elsewhere.
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Introduction
Visitors to South Carolina are treated to the best of what the state has to offer - those
sanitized and glorified sites that reflect beauty, history, and culture. The bright streets of Charleston;
the dredged sands of Myrtle Beach; the vibrancy of Greenville; the majesty of a reconstructed
Lowcountry plantation. Even many of the small towns reflect a sort of idyllic life that captures the
imagination, ripe with peach orchards, vegetable stands, blossoming magnolias, and quaint churches.
And yet, another type of town exists on the periphery. Hidden underneath the vibrant
economic veneer of the Piedmont region, these towns have names like Honea Path, Pelzer, Joanna,
Ninety-Six, Westminster, Norris, Lockhart, Whitmire, and a host of others. Rows of pines give way
to rows of small and faded homes with chipped paint on the walls and discouragement in the air.
They are clustered around empty concrete slabs, such as the one in Figure 1, or around standing yet
crumbling brick fortresses. Such towns can be found as self-sustaining entities, swaths within midsized towns, and, just as often, as specks in the breastplate of major cities.
These towns are the gravestones of the Southern textile industry. Textiles were the jug of
moonshine that carried the South through the pain of post-war economic reorganization, giving her
the strength to stand up again and begin to heal; a treatment that promised relief, but in some cases,
developed into dependency. This dependency varied among the counties of the South Carolina
Piedmont, but for a long stretch of time brought security and prosperity that was widespread. Just as
the South’s storied cotton empire was doomed by political mandate, though, so were her textiles
dealt a death blow by national and international decrees.
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Figure 1
Site of the Glenn-Lowry Mill (2021)
Whitmire, South Carolina

Tracking the rise and fall of the textile industry in the South generally, and in the South
Carolina Piedmont specifically, enables an understanding of the people impacted by textiles – twenty
percent of the state’s workforce in 1960, and far higher in actuality due to local multiplier effects.
This demographic has not disappeared with the mills, remaining a largely silent witness to economic
theory enacted. Correspondingly, this study illuminates the socioeconomic consequences of political
action. The philosophies that undergird grand press conferences and witty sayings in Washington,
D.C. are most keenly felt not by the politicians or the president or the press, but by Ms. Carrie
Harris – a former textile worker in Union – and Mr. Johnny Thomas – a barber in Lockhart – and a
million others like them across the nation whose lives are deemed an acceptable outlay in the cost-
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benefit analysis of economic tinkering.1 These were the men and women laughingly called
“lintheads” by their neighbors and who came to wear that moniker proudly, as a sign of their
affection for that strange white plant that sustained them, its humility and autochthony echoing their
own lives.
An analysis of their plight, then, transcribes the effects of economic policy and tracks
regional change. Towns are not passive test subjects; geographic and demographic advantages and
political and business leadership vary widely even in neighboring towns. Because of these facts, the
impact of the textile collapse diverges. Broadly, what has been the socioeconomic effect of the
textile collapse? Specifically, which towns and counties have managed this collapse the best, and
why? These are questions of history, politics, sociology, and economics, and they are the questions
that this paper will strive to answer.
Historical Overview
Evaluating the shadow that the textile industry cast over the South in the late twentieth
century necessitates looking at that sector’s roots, in the late 19th century, in the origins of cotton
mills themselves in the South as a component of the economic evolution of the region. To do so, we
must first look to the people. Remember that this was a region sandblasted by the Civil War; the
agricultural production that had clothed much of the Western world, and provided stability, albeit
through exploitation, had been kneecapped. And though cotton production would rebound in the
years following the war, it somehow lost its enriching effect along the way. In 1877, the per capita

1

Lockhart is Facing the Ultimate Test of Survival.” GoUpstate.com. https://www.goupstate.com/article/NC/
19950604/news/605185491/SJ
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income of the South was nearly three times lower than that of Northern states.2 Crippled from the
loss of a generation of young men, with the majority of her capital spent in the war effort and many
of her prominent cities burned, a milieu of hopelessness prevailed in the post-war South. Even
“throughout the countryside and in the small towns, travelers found the same grim poverty and
dilapidation” that prevailed in the cities, relates historian C. Vann Woodward.3 Mass outmigration
began to occur, with the Piedmont population of the Carolinas, Georgia and Alabama moving
westward en masse. In 1874, Mississippi Senator Lucius Lamar summarized the region’s situation
vividly: it was an entire people group “struck dumb by the magnitude of her reverses.”4

Figure 2
The Ruins of Columbia, South Carolina from the State Capitol (1865)5

C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South: 1877-1913 (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University
Press, 1951), 111.
2

3

Woodward, Origins, 108.

Lucius Lamar, “On Sumner and the South,” in The World’s Famous Orations: Vol X, ed. William Jennings Bryan
(New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1906), 64.
5 George N. Barnard, Columbia from the Capitol, Photograph (1865), The Met,
https://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/294497.
4
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With these regional struggles in mind, the struggle of rejuvenating the South’s economy –
much less reforming it – can be seen in a more sympathetic light. Historically, the economy of the
South was centered on agricultural staples, most recently cotton, upon which the entire livelihood of
the population depended either directly or indirectly. Persisting through the early 20th century, the
economy of the South continued to be “dominated by [this] single commodity.”6 By 1900, the
United States produced 4.73 billion pounds of cotton annually, of which only 34.5% was consumed
domestically.7 Cotton imports were negligible. All in all, the textile mills of the world were fed by
Southern cotton, to the tune of 66.4% of mill-supplied cotton in 1907.8 One newspaperman wrote
in 1904 that “when southern cotton prices drop, every man feels the blow; when cotton prices
advance, every industry throbs with vigor.”9
By 1908, South Carolina’s cotton production was continuing to increase, representing 8.8%
of the national total.10 In Union County, South Carolina, the early twentieth century saw “fewer
vegetables and less milk and honey produced, as the cash crop [of cotton] was finally yielding real
cash.”11 The agricultural dependency on cotton continued to increase for the entire state, rising by a
whopping 48.3% from 1879 to 1908. In the latter year, South Carolina planted over 2.5 million acres
in cotton.12 By comparison, in 2020, South Carolina had a mere 190,000 acres in cotton.13 Without

Gavin Wright, Old South, New South (New York: Harper Collins, 1986), 57.
“Cotton Production: 1908,” Department of Commerce and Labor: Bureau of the Census, 1909,
https://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/03322287no91-100ch11.pdf, 11.
6
7

“Cotton Production,” Department of Commerce, 37
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9

Wright, Old South, 59.
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“Cotton Production,” Department of Commerce, 15.
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Allan Charles, The Narrative History of Union County, South Carolina (Spartanburg, South Carolina: Reprint Co.,

1987), 320.

“Cotton Production,” Department of Commerce, 20.
“2021 Cotton Planted Area,” United States Department of Agriculture, accessed March 20, 2021,
https://www.nass.usda.gov/Charts_and_Maps/graphics/cotnacm.pdf.
12
13

8
risk of hyperbole, during these years, the overall economic condition of the state hinged on nature’s
beneficence and global demand for a single species of plant.
Although the boll weevil invasion of the 1920’s would demonstrate the hazard of
dependence on nature, the economic dependency on other regions did lessen somewhat over the
years; over half of American consumption of cotton took place in Southern textile mills by 1910,
and the development of mills and markets in Asia in that time frame provided a balance to the
historical dominance of the Northern and European market. Usage of the plant itself was also
diversified. Processing of cotton seed for oil, meal, linters, and hulls rose from 4% of the available
supply in 1872 to 62% in 1909, successfully turning waste into a marketable product.14 Regardless of
this diversification and vertical integration, the South’s feet were firmly on the rug of her cotton, in a
high-stakes gamble that it would not be yanked out from underneath her.

Figure 3
Sharecropper tending cotton (1937)
Spartanburg County, South Carolina15
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1957), 37.

James H. Street, The New Revolution in the Cotton Economy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,

Dorothea Lange, Son of Sharecropper Family at Work in the Cotton Near Chesnee, South Carolina, Photograph
(1937), Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/item/2017770239/.
15
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This gamble was partially unavoidable, however – the post-war South had no viable
alternative, with little capital or experience with which to immediately pivot. Perhaps, then, it is no
wonder that her farmers turned to that crop that they knew best – a desperate attempt to regain
normalcy and a sense of direction. Historian Walter Edgar wrote in 1992 that “because of the war,
South Carolina lost a generation of young white men and virtually all of its capital wealth. It
recovered from the former, but it has yet to recover from the latter.”16 The wealth of the antebellum
South had been invested with a single-minded vengeance in exactly those fields which the war most
disrupted: “land, agricultural equipment, and slaves.”17 The sporadic attempts at industrialization
effort immediately following the war faltered simply because “there was no money with which to
build cotton mills, ” let alone more expensive infrastructure.18
As eminent sociologist W.J. Cash put it, “the [postwar] South’s most pressing internal need
was money. To get money, then, it had turned with absorbing passion to the extension of the only
practice which, in its experience, had yielded it: the cultivation of cotton.”19 Yet cotton was a
demanding crop on the soil, itself requiring increasing capital and indebtedness to continue
cultivation. Cotton was “fickle and dangerous…a Fata Morgana, the pursuit of which was actually
bearing the South deeper and deeper into trouble.”20 Full economic dependence on cotton, even at
antebellum levels, was economically and environmentally unsustainable. The question then began to
arise from Southern leaders and thinkers: what would become of the new economy of this region?

16
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Would it – and could it – afford to be an exporting agricultural economy, an outlier in both the
country and the world? Or would it augment its Jeffersonian purity with the manufacturers and
industry so prized in the North, attempting to replicate the manufacturing base that had powered
the Northern states to victory? Even in the antebellum South, there were rumblings of industrial
development. The famous Graniteville Mill in Aiken, South Carolina, founded by pioneer
industrialist William Gregg, had started producing textiles as early as 1849, and Columbia had at least
two textiles mills during the war era, both of which were burned by Sherman.21 There was precedent
for this specific industry in the South, although social scorn and the preeminence of the cotton
culture had hindered its growth thus far.
As the years trickled by, Southern leaders increasingly recognized that an economic shift
towards industry was not only overdue, but that it was necessary. An industrialist from Mobile
argued in 1868 that the South must quit, once and for all, her economic idolatry of the transcendent
cotton boll “to the neglect of all other products,” both agricultural and industrial.22 The renewed
profitability of cotton farming and the slow rejuvenation of Southern capital, combined with the
Panic of 1873, hindered the growth of manufacturing. But the chorus of dissenters only grew louder.
Henry Grady, the prominent editor of the Atlanta Constitution, prophesied in 1886 that “the old
South rested everything on slavery and agriculture, unconscious that these could neither give nor
maintain healthy growth. The new South presents a perfect democracy…a hundred farms for every
plantation, fifty homes for every palace – and a diversified industry that meets the complex needs of

21

2000), 128.
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Marion B. Lucas, Sherman and the Burning of Columbia (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina,
Woodman, King Cotton, 322.
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this complex age.”23 Grady may have been the spokesman of the industrialization movement, but his
message was almost uniformly taken up and disseminated across the South. Eleven years later, the
Southern Cotton Spinners’ Association confidently pitched that, because of the proximity to inputs
and abundant labor, “this favored land was the essential home of cotton manufacturing,” and that
future success of mills was solely dependent on entrepreneurs “providing capital with which to buy
some machinery.”24
And in the decades following the war, when the world had never seemed more red in tooth
and fang, this capital was scraped up somehow. If Charlestonian capital could not be acquired and
the town was too insignificant for New York investment, municipal leaders turned to their citizens,
appealing to their civic spirit and desire for growth. In fact, over half of the textile mills in South
Carolina were community enterprises, financing by bonds or stock.25 The plan of Henry Grady and
others to revitalize the South was adopted by leaders from Anderson to Americus, transforming “an
economic development into a civic crusade inspired with a vision of social salvation.”26 Unusual in
the history of economic development, historian C. Vann Woodward relates, this hue and cry was
most noticeably taken up and enacted by “isolated Piedmont towns” as well as the big cities.27 It was
a social campaign, as mill building was “preached with burning zeal from platform and pulpit and
editorial cell.”28 And yet, though “every little town wanted a mill,” input from more substantial

Henry Grady, “The New South,” in The World’s Famous Orations: Vol X, ed. William Jennings Bryan (New
York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1906), 150.
23

Broadus Mitchell, The Rise of Cotton Mills in the South (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South
Carolina Press, 2001), 99.
24
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Mitchell, The Rise of Cotton Mills, 131.
Woodward, Origins, 133.

Woodward, Origins, 133.
Jack Blicksilver, "Cotton Manufacturing in the Southeast: An Historical Analysis," Studies in Business and
Economics Bulletin 5 (1959): 495, https://doi.org/10.1017/S002205070010943X.
27
28
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investors did allow for correspondingly substantial mills.29 William Gregg writes that “business men
of capital” were often called upon to assist the ascendancy of cotton manufacturing in South
Carolina, and true to his hope, those entrepreneurs arose.30
Often, they were businessmen who had either been born or had worked in northern states
and who understood the operations of mills. Dexter E. Converse was one such man. Born in
Vermont in 1829, Converse worked in mills in that state and in New York through his early years,
traveling southward to manage a North Carolina mill in 1854. After the war, he moved to
Spartanburg, rapidly working his way from manager to owner to industrialist. By his death in 1899,
he owned the D.E. Converse mill in Glendale, as well as having built three mills in Clifton. Thanks
to Converse and men like him, Spartanburg became a national leader in textiles; by 1907, the county
had nineteen textile mills, most in the state, valued at $5,418,822.31
Concurrent with the rise of business leaders was the ascension of other supporting
infrastructure development, namely electrification efforts. The existence of an industrial cluster
causes native innovation to spring up around it, postulates Michael Porter, and this did occur in the
South during this era. One indicator of this innovation was simply in the field of capital investment,
where newer, Southern mills far outstripped their aged Northern competitors – not only was the
gross capital investment in Southern mills higher, but the new mills were uniformly “equipped with
more up-to-date machinery than the mills of the old textile regions” of New England.32 Exposure to
newer and more efficient technology, as a rule, fosters further improvement of the same. The most

29
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William Gregg, Essays on Domestic Industry (Graniteville, South Carolina: Graniteville, 1941), 27.
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Kohn, Cotton Mills, 110.
Woodward, Origins, 132.
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prominent facet of this innovation, however, was in the field of electricity, where the South took a
national lead. Not only did the South boast “the first factory operated entirely by electricity,” but the
development of cheap power became a competitive advantage for Piedmont mills33. By 1927, over
90% of textile mills in the Carolinas were powered by electricity, a rate that far outstripped
comparable industries and regions.
In fact, the rapid development of power plants in the Piedmont of South Carolina overcame
the last major advantage of Northern states; “if the Piedmont South had not developed an adequate
and cheap source of power,” one historian notes, “cheap labor and lower transportation costs would
have been meaningless.”34 Reconstruction South Carolina may not have had research institutions or
financial centers or political power, but she did have rivers. In April of 1894, a hydroelectric plant in
Columbia made the news for powering a whopping seventeen electric motors, for a total of 1,105
horsepower.35 Concurrent innovations were happening elsewhere: a recent engineering graduate of
the University of South Carolina, William Whitner, began to electrify his hometown of Anderson
with a coal-powered steam plant in 1890. After realizing the cost-prohibitive nature of coal for
intensive energy demands the young man journeyed to New York to consult with Nikola Tesla, and
then returned to his hometown to shock natives with a plan to transport electricity from his
envisioned hydropower plant on the small Rocky River, a full six miles outside of town. In 1895, his
revolutionary alternating-current plant became operational and began powering the town. Anderson
became known as “The Electric City,” and towns around the South began to take notice.

33

Woodward, Origins, 132.

Robert F. Durden, “Electrifying the Piedmont Carolinas: Part 2,” North Carolina Historical Review 77:1 (2000):
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Yet Whitner’s creativity was not exhausted, and he realized improvements could be made.
Contracting with a Massachusetts company to build customized commercial generators, Whitner
built a massive, 4,000 horsepower hydroelectric plant on the nearby Seneca River, at High Shoals. It
was to be “the first long-distance transmission power [plant] established in the South.”36 The buyer
of the electricity? The fledgling Anderson Cotton Mill, producing standard print cloths, which had
just opened in 1890.37
Buck Duke, the tobacco titan of North Carolina, began experimenting with hydroelectric
power as early as 1894, and quickly focused on the Catawba River as the prime investment for his
seemingly boundless capital. The Catawba flowed adjacent to existing population hubs, running
from Asheville through Hickory and Charlotte and down through the South Carolina counties of
York, Chester, and Lancaster before drifting down to the sea. Buck Duke’s primary goal, not only
for selecting the Catawba as his entry point but for venturing into hydroelectric at all, was first and
foremost to “spur industrialization in the Piedmont Carolinas through the growth of textile
manufacturing.”38 To achieve this goal, he teamed with two key figures: Dr. Gill Wylie of the new
Catawba Power Company, and none other than William Whitner, who designed a large-scale
hydropower plant that became operational in 1904. Wylie was a renowned gynecologist and
hydroelectric visionary who brought a dream of electrifying the Catawba River and a knack for
persuading Duke to support this dream.
In 1905, Duke and Wylie partnered to incorporate the Southern Power Company – now the
Duke Energy Corporation – with total stock of $7.5 million, headquarters in nearby Charlotte, and

36
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their first major project at Great Falls in Chester County.39 By 1907, the plant was producing 24,000
kilowatts and transmitting energy to Charlotte and beyond. Furthermore, electrification slashed the
operating expenses of mills – labor, capital, and materials – enabling profits to correspondingly
boom.
Funding for these hydroelectric projects on the Seneca and Catawba Rivers was thus scraped
together by a combination of financial tools, including city bonds, investment by the founders, and
financing from either Duke or wealthy investors from Charleston.40 Compared to many other
Southern states, South Carolina was fortunate to have Charleston, a trading city of historical
prominence financial means. Entire mill towns grew from the investment of that city, including
Piedmont, Pelzer, Clifton, and Pacolet.41 When both Southern investment and local capital ran dry,
prospective mill towns were forced to turn to New York selling houses for long term financing, or
to strike a profit-sharing agreement with machinery suppliers to offset the initial cost.42
Key financiers and innovators, then, were early competitive advantages of the South
Carolina Piedmont. Geography certainly played a key role as well. The rivers that drained the
Appalachians provided raw energy ripe for the tapping, and powered by the rapidly developing
hydroelectric technology, mills took advantage of this natural resource. Hydropower was not a
prerequisite for the creation of mills – the colossal Union-Buffalo mill, for instance, had its own
coal-fired power plant. The clustering of South Carolina mills around rivers, however, lends
credence to the theory of simple, flowing water serving as a competitive advantage.

Durden, “Electrifying: Part 1,” 428.
40 Durden, “Electrifying: Part 1,” 425.
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W.P. Swaffield, treasurer of a South Carolina mill in 1880, opined that “we have everything
in this State to make cotton manufactures a success. Cheap land, cheap fuel, cheap labor, and the
great advantage of having the cotton right at hand – being able to work the year round without any
interruption from the cold.”43 He estimated cost savings of 1.25-1.5 cents/lb. cost savings compared
to New England. W.J. Cash emphasizes the labor cost differential alone, stating that increased
freight costs in the South somewhat offset the input proximity, and that the climate of the region
lowered efficiency. Although the North carried over a labor productivity advantage, this disappeared
in the production of coarser cloths, where “interregional productivity differentials were non-existent
or negligible.”44 Moreover, property taxes were substantially lower in the South during this era.
David Doane reports that “between 1870 and 1890, the ratio of Northern to Southern taxes per
$100 of assessed valuation were between 1.20 and 1.25.”45 Combined with the cheap prices of
cotton – 7-8% lower than the North – the average total cost of production for coarse goods was an
estimated 15% lower in the Southern states, and it was in this particular sector that the region
specialized.46
Demographically, it was the poor white farmer of the Piedmont that leaped at the
opportunity to work in the mills. Freed from the drudgery and risk of farming, these men and
women proved to be “quick to learn, and generally honest and industrious;” and perhaps most
importantly, content with their condition.47 After the economic dearth of the past thirty years,

43 South Carolina Department of Agriculture, The Cotton Mills of South Carolina (Charleston, South Carolina: The
News and Courier Book Presses, 1880), https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044082118431, 8.
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University, 1969), https://login.pallas2.tcl.sc.edu/login?url=https://www-proquest-com.pallas2.tcl.sc.edu/dissertationstheses/regional-structure-cotton-textile-industry-1880/docview/302459150/se-2?accountid=13965, 176.
45 Doane, “Regional Structure,” 23.
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Southern peasants did not dream of unionization and the demands of Northern workers. The
clapboard houses that sprang up around mills “were palaces compared to the old log cabin on the
farm,” W.P. Hamrick wrote in 1924.48 Although the salary and working conditions - $3 a week for
72 hours work at the turn of the century – are shocking by modern standards, the fact that so many
jumped at the opportunity speaks to the economic despair of the post-war South.49 It was also
common for children to be employed at the mills in those early days; a situation that Broadus
Mitchell optimistically views as “not avarice then, but philanthropy,” as it gave extra means of
livelihood to supplement a family’s income and mirrored the amount of work they would have done
on the farm.50 Others took the opposite view; and, in any case, employment of children was phased
out over the next few decades.

Figure 4
Textile mill family at their home, 1908
South Carolina 51

W.P. Hamrick, “Development of the Textile Industry in South Carolina,” The Journal of Social Forces 3[1]
(1924): 106-109, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3005491, 108.
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Cotton mills bloomed across the South, finding a particular haven in the Piedmont regions
of North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama. Of the four, South Carolina shone
brightest – journalist August Kohn wrote that “it is admitted on all sides that South Carolina holds
first place among the Southern States in the development of the cotton mill industry.”52 This had
not always been the case. In 1820, there were forty-two cotton mills incorporated in the South
(including Maryland), of which South Carolina only had three, all of which spun cotton yarns.53

Figure 5
Mollahan Mill, 1908
Newberry, South Carolina 54

A sustainable baseline of economic opportunity thus sprouted where once there had been
none. In his authoritative economic report of 1907, entitled “The Cotton Mills of South Carolina,”

Kohn, Cotton Mills, 6.
53 Kohn, Cotton Mills, 6.
54 Lewis Wickes Hine, Type of Young Woman at Spinning Machine in Cotton Mills, photograph (1908), Library of
Congress, https://www.loc.gov/item/2018674016/.
52
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Kohn writes the new issue was a lack of workers to fill the posts at the mills. “There are more
spindles and looms in this country than there are people to work them,” he bluntly states.55 With the
explosion in this widespread economic opportunity for the South’s citizens came a renewal of hope,
casting off the hopelessness and despair that had characterized the immediate post-war period. One
contemporary witness directly tied the ascension of the mills to this social rebirth: “The stagnation
of despair has, by some magic transformation, given place to the buoyance of hope, of courage, of
resolve…We are a new people.”56
By 1925, it was little South Carolina that led the nation in the production of cotton products.
And yet, after the first World War, the explosion of mills in the state led to a “false image of
prosperity” caused by overproduction and overinvestment.57 Competition took the reins, leading to
the stretch-out system of extended work hours, and declining wages across the board. The Great
Depression burst this prosperity bubble, as the general economic state was exacerbated by the debt
of textile mills and attempts at unionization. “No matter what goods any mills produced, there was
almost no market” in the early 1930s, reports one historian.58 The push for collective labor
bargaining had its pinnacle in the General Textile Strike of 1934, which in turn saw its apogee in the
sleepy mill town of Honea Path, in Anderson County. In that year, the Chiquola Mill witnessed an
all-out battle between hundreds of armed and striking laborers and anti-union forces, reportedly
featuring all manner of firearms and even a machine gun from the first World War. Seven laborers
were killed and more injured in the clash.59 There were triumphs, though, even in the midst of unrest
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and depression: by 1939, the town of Lancaster laid claimed to the largest print-cloth mill not just in
the state, but in the world.60

Figure 6
Chiquola Manufacturing Company
Honea Path, South Carolina 61

World War II brought the resurgence in demand and rapid innovation that the textile
industry desperately needed. During and after the war, “textile production soared with new fibers,
new production, and new markets” according to an owner of Ottaray Mills in Anderson.62 In a case
study of the Southern Piedmont, Anthony Tang found that Union County increased its value-added
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in manufacturing per capita from 1939 – 1947, rising an incredible $802 during these years.63
Greenville, Spartanburg, Lancaster, and Anderson were close behind, both in the increased figure
and real dollar amount. The next two decades continued this trend of growth, with innovations and
advancements in machinery, fibers, and infrastructure giving staying power to the industry. The
1950s saw an enormous coup for the state, as Milliken and Co., one of the largest textile
manufacturers in the nation, relocated to Spartanburg County from New York.
By the time 1960 rolled around, the textile and apparel industry employed 20% of the
workforce of the entire state. The vast majority of these employees were concentrated in the
Piedmont region. Unlike many manufacturing sectors, mill jobs were open to women, who
represented 44.75% of the textile workforce in that year. When looking at the demographics, mill
work was also prejudiced towards the white population, who represented a full 94% of textile
workers in the state in that year. Nearly one out of every three white workers in the state –
manufacturing or not – worked for the textile or apparel industry in 1960. The scope of the industry
is eyepopping now, and was a source of pride then.
Although the state began to diversify somewhat over the next ten years, by 1970 the industry
had reached a peak of total employment: 184,200 workers in the textile and apparel industries, with
61% of these in the former and 39% in the latter sector. Of these, the vast majority – around four
out of every five – worked on the floor of the factory, either as craftsmen or operatives. It could be
considered a high-production, low-overhead industry at this point: only 3% of textile workers were
in the professional fields, such as engineering, accounting, and mathematics, and sales (primarily in
apparel) only represented 0.3% of total workers. In 1970, as throughout much of the preceding
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century, the base opportunity was there for rural or urban members of the state’s workforce to earn
a decent living in a steady job, in an industry that seemed invincible to the clanging of the economy.
Far from stagnating under its own weight, the textile industry in South Carolina was highly
responsive to technological advancement. Doane cites Southern technological superiority as early as
1880 as a key factor in textile ascendancy – in the adoption of ring spinning, the revolving flat card,
the automatic loom, and the use of electricity, “the South is believed to have adopted the changes
more rapidly than the North.”64 It was obsolescence in machinery, George Tindall asserts, that
“penalized the New England mills;” the South’s technological advantage helped her gain textile mills
in the first place.65 A century later, in order to compete with foreign advantages in labor costs and
keep pace with domestic rivals, Southern mills again turned to technological improvement to
survive. During the 1990s, “there were significant advancements in technology in the textile
industry,” recalls one mill executive, “and a lot of domestic producers invested heavily in upgrading
equipment.”66 The economic census of 1992 reports capital investment of $31.4 million in Chester
County; $31.6 million in Pickens County; and, of course, a whopping $60.7 million in Spartanburg
County. These are hardly the investment figures of an industry pursuing a scalping strategy.
Economic evolution brings forth societal disruption; that much is undisputed. Even growth
is inequitable, necessitating participation in the growth-producing activities to reap the benefits and
always featuring some level of negative tradeoffs from that participation. Moving into mill towns,
families realized that they were now spared the physical exhaustion of agriculture, but lost the varied
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work of a farm. Town living was easy, but weaned denizens from self-dependency. And mill work
brought a real sense of community, but carried health ramifications with it. In a recent interview, a
former worker at the Union Cotton Mill recalled the health hazards from mill work. Workers often
lost the tips of their fingers from managing the hopper, a machine that beat the cotton and often
jammed. Lung issues were common, including brown lung and asbestos lung problems; several
workers in Union died from the latter, “and their families were never compensated. That was one of
the downsides [of mill work]. It was in the air, and you walked in there and you’re breathing it, and
you go in their every day for eight or nine hours a day – your system just gets coated with it”67.
And yet, the benefits of textile mills – the upsides of manufacturing – were tangible then and
gut-wrenching now in their absence. When the Lockhart Mill in Union County closed in 1994, one
resident reflected that “there were no unions here because people were satisfied…satisfied with their
jobs, satisfied with their supervisors, satisfied with themselves.”68 Self-styled mill towns that allowed
themselves to become dependent on their benefactors, such as Lockhart, saw decades of stability,
ease, and prosperity. Graham Williams, editor of the Union County News, relates that “you had
generations of families that worked in the mill; the mill provided everything for the people of this
town.”69
Again, there were negative aspects to this gamble. Ware Shoals, located on the border of
Greenwood and Anderson counties, presents perhaps the primary case study in economic
paternalism that led to absolute dependency. The Riegel Manufacturing Co. built the town’s houses,
the town hall, and the schools, managed the baseball team, owned a dairy and town store, and paid
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60% of the property taxes and 20% of school taxes.70 Robert E. Coleman, chairman of the company,
was a voice of confidence as late as 1982, projecting in that year that “our renewal will come when
there’s an improvement in the general economic health.”71 It was not to be. In 1984, the mill
abruptly shuttered, leaving the town devastated – it was “a season of bitter reckoning” for their
dependency, as one writer put it.72

Figure 7
Abney Mills Baseball Team
Newry, South Carolina73

Lancaster faced much the same situation as Ware Shoals. Just as Ware Shoals was supported
by Riegel, the larger town of Lancaster had grown along with the Springs Manufacturing Company,
operator of the Lancaster Cotton Mill in town, the Kershaw Mill a mile to the south, and a host of
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others. Springs was a homegrown success that had risen to become one of the largest companies in
the state. Steady manufacturing jobs meant security, and security began to regress into complacency.
“People in Lancaster didn’t have much reason to pursue college degrees or specialized job training,
and the town didn’t have much reason to recruit other employers,” relates one account.74
Uniformly, the decline of Southern mills is blamed on a rise in foreign competition. As early
as the late 1960s, businessmen were sounding the alarm on the threat of imported textiles and
apparel. Mills that produced print cloth, which included most larger Piedmont facilities, sell in a
hyper-competitive market where all products are commodities, nearly indistinguishable between
companies. Price is the only differentiator in such a market. For example, Inman Mills in
Spartanburg produced base, gray-colored broadcloths in 1965 that “have no identity as far as the
consumer is concerned,” as company president James Chapman Jr. put it.75 As a result of this
product identity, the increasingly competitive global market was hurting Inman more than
comparable mills. On a macroeconomic level, it started to add up: the textile trade deficit in 1979
stood at $3.4 billion.76
In 1985, the President of the American Textile Manufacturers Institute tied the flood of
imports to unequal labor conditions. “Our markets are overwhelmed by imports of yarn, fabric,
clothing and home furnishings from foreign manufacturers whose low wages and working
conditions would be unlawful in the U.S. Since 1980, more than 300,000 fiber, textile and apparel
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workers have lost their jobs.”77 Riegel Manufacturing, in Ware Shoals, blamed their closing on an
inability to compete with “an unchecked flood of low-cost foreign imports.”78 One study reported
that an American textile worker earned 33 times what his Chinese counterpart did.79 The gap in
labor costs could not be overcome, and textile mills fled the South like rabbits from a wildfire.
Not all imports during this era, it must be noted, were finished or even intermediate
products. Reliance on Southern cotton was also slipping; a sign of a weakening cluster that went
beyond the mills themselves. In 1985, for instance, 37% of the cotton used by American mills was
grown abroad.80 Cotton farmer Joey Wilson of Chester relates that his county originally housed all
elements of the textile supply chain. “We used to have cotton seed breeding and production,
ginning, warehousing, spinning, weaving, dyeing, cut and sew, tractor dealers, fertilizer
manufactures, textile equipment, and textile art firms. We had every part of the business from the
cotton seed to bedsheets sold at retail.”81 Chester’s mills moved began moving overseas as early as
1990 and continuing until the mid-2000s, and the entire textile cluster imploded around their
absence.

Ellison S. McKissick, “Letter to the Editor: Sweatshirts and Sweatshops,” New York Times (New York), Sept.
4, 1985, https://global-factiva-com.pallas2.tcl.sc.edu/ha/default.aspx#./!?&_suid=161759302082008817082575987145.
77

78

Schmidt, “Town Built,” New York Times.

79 Rhonda Zingraff, “Facing Extinction?”, in Hanging by a Thread: Social Change in Southern Textiles, ed. Jeffery
Leiter, Michael D. Schulman, and Rhonda Zingraff (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, 1991), 199-216.
https://www-jstor-org.pallas2.tcl.sc.edu/stable/pdf/10.7591/ j.ctvr6978t.15.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A46c24156d
2e2f4838fd61d5ad9a24d70. 207.
80 “Textile Industry Imports, too,” New York Times (New York). Oct. 10, 1985,
https://login.pallas2.tcl.sc.edu/login?url=https://www-proquest-com.pallas2.tcl.sc.edu/historical-newspapers/textileindustry-imports-too/docview/111305751/se-2?accountid=13965.
81 Joseph Wilson (farmer in Lowrys, South Carolina) in discussion with the author, February 2021.

27

Figure 8
Union-Buffalo Mill
Union County, South Carolina 82

Understanding the reason for this decline in the South Carolina textile powerhouses
necessitates a brief overview of the political happenings that allowed for this rising and crippling
international competition. The Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) of 1974 was the first primary vehicle
of the textile globalization project, seeking to expand “trade in textile products, particularly for the
developing countries, and progressively to achieve the reduction of trade barriers and the
liberalization of trade in textile products.”83 Simultaneously, and perhaps contradictorily, it aimed to
avoid economic disruption in both importing and exporting nations. Unusually, it also allowed for
individual discrimination among nations in bilateral export quota arrangements. Foreign imports,

82

Buffalo Cotton Textile Mill, Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/item/sc0766/.

83 Ninety-Ninth Congress, “The Textile and Apparel Trade Enforcement Act: Hearings Before the
Subcommittee of International Trade,” Sept. 12, 1985, https://books.google.com/books?id=Q3ldzuSUccC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false.

28
however, were allowed to increase up to 8% a year; a number that Senator Strom Thurmond of
South Carolina took issue with, stating that “he was deeply concerned about countries like Red
China coming in on such a heavy mass scale of imports.”84 By 1984, the United States had
negotiated deals with twenty-four countries under the MFA, generally for three-year intervals. and
domestic textile employment had dropped by 15% over the past decade.
Despite the prevailing political winds of free trade, certain politicians were determined that
the textile industry, the backbone of their states, would not slip demurely into the void. The primary
legislation of resistance was the Textile and Apparel Trade Enforcement (TATE) Act of 1985,
written by Representative Ed Jenkins of Georgia and sponsored in the Senate by Thurmond. The
Act proposed curtailing textile imports from three of the Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Taiwan, South
Korea) and freezing imports from other developing countries (such as China, Thailand, Brazil,
Indonesia, and Pakistan) at 101% of 1984 levels.85 These specified countries in the Act, entirely from
Asia and South America, represented 73% of total textile and apparel imports in 1984. Furthermore,
the act would grant protection to all fabrics, including silk, ramie, jute, and linen, as opposed to the
MFA triad of cotton, wool, and manmade fibers. It was a bipartisan effort – Thurmond’s
Democratic counterpart, Senator Ernest F. Hollings, was also strongly in favor of the protectionist
policy. In a prescient statement, Representative Ed Jenkins of Georgia gave his reasoning for the act:
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“there are small communities that are almost totally dependent on this industry for their entire
livelihood. If the industry falls, the entire economic base of the town falls.”86
It is a fascinating historical shift. In 1829, Senator Robert Y. Hayne, of South Carolina, built
a free-trade political legacy by debating the Yankee colossus Daniel Webster on the tariff issue,
pleading that protectionist tariffs were “utterly destructive of [the South’s] interests.”87 Yet it was
William McKinley, the Ohioan, who as a Congressman in 1888 best foreshadowed the dilemma of
the textile industry: “How are we to undersell the foreign product? By making the manufacturing
cost of our goods less than theirs. In other words, by cutting down the wages of our skilled and
unskilled labor.”88 Nearly a hundred years later, Jenkins, Hollings, and Thurmond were perfectly
echoing this plea.
The TATE Act was vetoed by Reagan in 1985 on two main grounds: the first being the
dogmatic free trade argument that tariffs would drive up clothing costs and result in retaliatory
action, and the second being the reasoning that passage would jeopardize existing trade agreements,
namely the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).89 The free trade camp concluded that
200,000 American textile jobs would have been lost anyway from 1973-1984 merely through
productivity improvements alone. Thurmond threatened to override Reagan’s veto, but, lacking the
threshold of Congressional support, the effort withered.
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Beginning in 1947, GATT was a series of consecutive agreements among a broadening
global representation, beginning a diverse set of twenty-three nations that included the United
States, France, the United Kingdom, and the developing nations of China, Syria, Burma, and others.
The stated goal of the negotiations was to advance free trade principles by mutually reducing tariffs
and all other forms of economic protectionism.
The Uruguay Round, negotiated over a whopping seven years from 1986-1993, was widely
considered the most ambitious trade negotiation of human history. Not only did it stretch into
nearly every field of international commerce, it abolished the GATT process itself, rebirthing into
the World Trade Organization (WTO). Uruguay reduced the base manufacturing tariff rate from
6.2% to 4% and abolished protection altogether in several major industries (notably agriculture and
biomedical). Although it did allow for an eight-year tariff for goods “imported in quantities
sufficient to cause serious injury to the domestic industry,” the agreement singled out the MFA for
phased elimination over ten years, bringing textile protection down to the level allowed for other
goods.90 Again, there was a widespread hue and cry against the complete removal of the MFA. As
the Uruguay Round was being finalized in 1993, one textile representative predicted that the
agreement “will cause the loss of some one million United States textile and apparel jobs as it
surrenders our market to producers from India, Pakistan and China.”91
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Because of these trade agreements, Southern mills began feeling the pinch of competition in
a major way. The Piedmont powerhouses that had built their name on cheap, lightweight
commodity cloth were simply unable to keep up with foreign labor advantage. Faced abruptly with
ballooning imports at far lower prices from foreign firms, the Southern mills that survived pivoted
both fast and hard. Inman Mills in Spartanburg is one such company; as of 2021, they boast three
healthy mills due to a combination of debt aversity and product diversity. In a recent interview with
company executive Ellis Fisher, he relates that “in the past twenty years, we have become much
more diversified and niche-driven, finding higher quality products.” Inman can now produce over
five hundred combinations of fabric from a portfolio of thirty individual fibers, specializing in
everything from fire-retardant yarns to industrial fabric for conveyor belts to heavy-duty cloth for
the U.S. military. Fisher specifically points to the full entry of China and other Asian countries into
global free trade agreements as the cause for the Southern textile collapse; although his company has
scraped through, “when China entered the WTO, the entire industry in South Carolina changed.”
He identified cheap labor as the primary cause, spurred by “artificial deflation of wages, currency
manipulation, governmental support, and lower environmental standards” of foreign competitors.92
True to James Chapman’s recognition in 1965 and Fisher’s corroboration in 2021, the
specific products hardest hit by the rise in foreign competition were the broadcloth fabric mills. In a
textile cluster analysis of the state in 2003, Michael Porter calculated that it was this sector –
popularly known as commodity cloth – that represented approximately 45% of all textile
employment loss between 1990 and 2001.93 Yarn and thread, finishing plants, carpets and rugs, and
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specialty fabric processing were other sectors that saw significant job loss during this time. Porter’s
report was damning; although South Carolina had the fourth largest textile cluster nationally, there
was little innovation output from the state, with a lack of interaction and communication with
research institutions and a difficult environment for startups representing other barriers to long-term
health of the cluster. He also warned that the key textile customers of apparel and furniture were
rapidly moving offshore, taking away a formerly strong local base of demand.
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a trade deal negotiated
simultaneously with the Uruguay Round and passed into law in 1994, preempted the negative impact
of Uruguay with a rush of Mexican apparel imports into the United States. Prior to NAFTA, only
35% of textile and apparel imports from Mexico were subjected to a tariff, priced at 17.9%.94 By
2004, the tariffs on all textile and apparel trade between the United States and Mexico were phased
out completely.
Yet by 1996, it was China had become the world’s largest exporter of textiles and apparel,
overwhelming even Mexican manufacturers with a flood of imports into the United States.95 In
2005, the WTO officially terminated the MFA’s export quota system for apparel and textile goods,
the final step in the proposed phase-outs. In order to compensate industries and regions that were
losers in this globalized game of economic cooperation, Congress authorized the Trade Adjustment
Authorization (TAA) program in 1962 and ramped it up during the early 2000s. The TAA provided
job reeducation programs and increased unemployment for workers displaced due to import
competition under the new trade agreements. Analyses of its efficacy, however, have found that
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there is “no statistical evidence that the TAA program improves the average employment outcome
of beneficiaries,” and the Office of Management and Budget classified the program as
“ineffective.”96
By most accounts, the MFA had been nothing short of a failure. The libertarian-minded
decried its legacy for exception-making, failing to save textile jobs in developed nations, and
distorting the market “based not on optimal economic considerations but primarily on avoiding
quota restrictions.”97 And they had a point. Before the complete elimination of MFA quotas, China
represented 16% of the US/Canada market share for textiles; after the quotas were removed, this
jumped to 50%.98 More liberal Americans railed that “millions of jobs [in developing nations] were
at risk just from the end of the quotas,” combined with the necessary fall in the dollar from a
growing trade deficit that would backfire on the United States as a whole.99 And they, too, had a
point. Apart from China and India, the market share of all other country’s imports into the United
States dropped from 24% to 10% after removal of the quotas.
In 2009, a United Nations report concluded that the “T&G [textile and garment] sector…is
one of the most globalized of any in the world economy,” a globalization that “owes much less to
normal market forces than to trade distortions, particularly the Multi-fibre Arrangement and its
successor, the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC).”100 Furthermore, contrary to the
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assertions of neoclassical economists, a recent report concluded that “that there is little evidence for
substantial offsetting employment gains in local industries that are not exposed to the trade
shock.”101 There was no manufacturing employment shift from textiles and apparel, the so-called
comparative advantages of Asia, to those manufacturing sectors favorable to the United States.
Unemployment and a shift to service industries replaced dreams of reallocation.
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Figure 9

By 2006, the collapse was nearly complete. The prime example of that collapse can be found
in none other than Wylie’s beloved Catawba region of York, Chester, and Lancaster counties.
Springs Industries – the largest manufacturing employer in South Carolina in 1987 – had only
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recently changed their name to Springs Global. In 2006, following the WTO phase-out of all textile
protections, the company announced that it would be immediately moving the last of its
manufacturing operations to Brazil. The cost disparity in labor was simply too great. With that
decision, the last 760 textile jobs in Chester County were lost, as well as others in York and
Lancaster. In a press release, the chairmen of Springs inadvertently records an insider look of the
industry mindset at the time.
“The actions we are announcing today reflect both the positive and negative impacts of
adapting to the current highly competitive [globalized] industry environment. We deeply
regret the loss of jobs in South Carolina and the impact on the lives of our employees, who
have done an outstanding job of reducing costs and improving efficiencies.

On the positive side, we are fortunate to have operations in South America that are both
very competitive and have the ability to add capacity relatively quickly.”102
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Analysis of South Carolina Piedmont Counties
The historical record indicates that the economic dependency of the South on textiles and
apparel caused an eventual economic disruption. The political record relays that it was the surge in
foreign imports, especially from Asia, that overcame the labor advantage that the South initially had.
And the sociological record flashes pictures of paint-flaked mill houses, population collapse, and a
strangling death for towns dependent on mills.
It is the convergence of each of these factors that comprises a proper economic analysis. For
this specific analysis, I seek to probe the historical result of this manufacturing reliance on a single
industry, the socioeconomic impact of this economic disruption on places that relied on textiles, and
the impact that state and local economic development policies had on combating the challenge.
What was the impact of economic and political globalization, was the change uniform or inequitable,
and what is the path of survival?
In order to answer these questions, I will primarily examine thirteen counties in the
Piedmont region of South Carolina that can be classified as dependent on the textile industry. For
simplicity’s sake, unless specified, usage of the term “textile” in the context of establishments or the
overall industry also includes the conjoined apparel industry. Far from the simple cotton mills of the
late 19th century, these two industries increasingly comingled; the “fates of textiles and apparels are
intertwined,” as one economist puts it.103
These thirteen Piedmont counties have been selected for research after meeting two
thresholds. First, they represented the original top thirteen South Carolina counties in terms of their
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tax value of textile and apparel mills, as given in Kohn’s 1907 report; this establishes a historical
investment on the textile industry that initiated concurrent with the rest of the regional industry.
Secondly, these thirteen counties were economically dependent on this single industry for
manufacturing employment. In 1960, at the employment zenith of the industry, textile and apparel
workers represented over 65% of the manufacturing employment for each county, and in several
cases this rate was at a whopping 90%. Given these two qualifying factors, there were only two
counties that were questionable: Aiken and Richland, both of which met the first qualification but
markedly failed the dependency quotient, and thus were discarded from consideration. These
county-level figures can be seen in Figure 12.
County
TV
PofWF
Spartanburg
1
79%
Anderson
2
81%
Greenville
3
75%
Union
5
90%
York
7
76%
Newberry
8
75%
Cherokee
9
86%
Pickens
10
68%
Laurens
11
78%
Greenwood
12
84%
Lancaster
13
88%
Oconee
14
81%
Chester
15
90%
TV: 1907 Tax Value Rank
PofWF: 1960 % of Manufacturing Workforce

Figure 12

These counties are illustrated in the map below, with the color gradient representing their
approximate manufacturing dependency on textiles (“PofWF” in the table above) in 1960, the height
of the textile industry. Notice, particularly, the proximity of these counties to the Appalachian
mountain chain. This geographic location meant access to rivers, and earned them the epithet
“Piedmont,” from the French word for “foothills.”
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Map created by J. Ward

Figure 13
It is no coincidence that these textile-dependent counties represent this consolidated
geographic region within the state – it was a region that, at the establishment of the mills, contained
the advantageous resources of flowing water, a poor working-class population, and cotton. The first
two of these factors has been sufficiently covered to this point. The third merits a closer look. This
relationship matters because the cotton industry constitutes regional precedent for the economic
dependency on textiles, and in fact, the growing regional reliance on textile and apparel companies
merely represented a slight shift of the former dependency on cotton. Furthermore, local cotton was
the most immediate satellite industry of the textile and apparel cluster. These thirteen counties,
representing 24.8% of the land mass of the state, produced 39.1% of the state’s cotton in 1907. This
figure was an increase of 43,323 bales from only two years prior.104
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To analyze if there truly was a correlation between presence of textile mills and virility of
cotton production in these selected counties, I took the count of textile mills from August Kohn’s
1907 survey and ran it with a simple linear regression against county-level cotton production data
from the United States Department of Agriculture, also from 1907. That regression is plotted below.

Figure 14
For every mill constructed in one of these thirteen counties, the data reports a correlated rise
of 2,033 bales of cotton, or roughly 994 additional acres in cotton.105 Perhaps the establishment of
mills spurred local farmers to plant more cotton, or perhaps the mills selected their locations
according to the existence of a flourishing cotton culture. Likely, it was a combination of both
factors. It is important to note that the number of mills is not the only causation for an increased
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amount of cotton – the adjusted R-squared for this data is only 0.375. However, a low p-value of
0.015 provides the statistical confidence to accept the hypothesis of correlation with fervor.
This background is critical to the understanding of South Carolina’s economic condition and
the roots of its reliance on the textile/apparel industry. It was a state built on churning out of staples
– even before cotton, fields of indigo and rice had powered the Lowcountry’s early ascendancy. The
need for capital after the war prompted a gamble, one that the entire state, and much of the region,
threw itself behind with all it could muster. W.J. Cash puts it vividly: the economic objective postwar was “not the building of a dozen mills or even a hundred mills, but more than a thousand mills.
And this not slowly, but swiftly, now, as rapidly as the human will could achieve it.”106 It was a
triumph that the economic boosters and leaders of the day lauded – a foray into industrialism, a true
diversification of the economy.
But it was still a marked dependence on a single industry; still a dependence on the primary
and tenuous competitive advantage of cheap labor; and still a dependence on cotton. Furthermore, it
was a gamble that not all counties took equally. As evidenced by Figure 2, these thirteen Piedmont
counties all invested heavily in the textile industry, that much is true. However, the percentage of
investment by each county differed in several key ways.
With these facts in mind, the key questions of this thesis arise. Has the globalization of the
textile industry affected all counties equally? Can the societal effects of this economic change be
quantified at the county level? And most critically, did over-reliance on this single industry for
manufacturing jobs come back to bite counties?
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Figure 15

When charting the impact of one specific industry on the economic and social health of
towns and counties, there are a host of factors to consider. As covered previously, there are the
political factors. Laws and treaties are key to the health of industry, perhaps more so than any other
cause. Because they cover industries at a national level, however, the impact of these laws will be
uniform across the counties considered.
From a surface level, Southern counties and towns can seem about as unique as a forest of
loblolly pines. Peer in closer, however, and a myriad of differences appear, a collection too vast to be
quantified or examined in the scope of this paper. Educational institutes and the condition of them
differ: the economic impact of Lander University on Greenwood County varies from the impact of
Winthrop University on York County, even though enrollment and achievement statistics may
correspond. Geographic issues vary widely. Union County and Chester County share a border, a
river, and had a similar growth in the textile industry; and yet Chester features a major highway while
Union does not. Similarly, Union is physically closer to certain businesses and institutions than
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Chester, and vice versa. Often, historical differences can be attributed to a single individual: a
Converse, Wylie, or a Whitner that drives change in a town, the ripple effect of which echoes
throughout history in inscrutable ways. Furthermore, due to the realities of fickle and ever-changing
history, even the situation within a county is ever-changing. Writing on the development of local
business clusters, Michael Porter affirms that their condition “continually evolves as new firms and
industries emerge, established industries shrink or decline, and local institutions develop and
change.”107
The situation is not without hope, however. Several key indicator variables can be tracked
that enable broad generalizations regarding both the economic and social conditions of counties;
variables that can never tell the whole story or truthfully provide a complete comparison, but that
can certainly aid in the effort. In order to begin this process with the thirteen select Piedmont
counties, I have broken them up into three preliminary groups to briefly overview each one, and to
show their rates of population change over the key time frame.
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Rates of Population Growth - County Grouping #1
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Figure 16

A first grouping can easily be made based on simple population size of the counties. In 1960,
these were the four largest counties out of the Piedmont, with Greenville leading the way at 209,776
citizens and an impressive 23,517 workers in the textile and apparel industry and Spartanburg not far
behind either figure. Greenville and Spartanburg were, and still remain, the epicenter of the
Piedmont textile cluster. When August Kohn was auditing textiles in 1906, these four counties
represented 56% of the total textile mills of the Piedmont. Spartanburg, long the industrial
spearhead of South Carolina, led the way with nineteen total mills and a host of mill towns
beginning to orbit Spartanburg itself, with names like Inman, Wellford, Enoree, and Glendale. As
the hometown of William Whitner, the hydropower expert, Anderson received a jumpstart on its
neighbors, with six mills in 1906 and the communities of Belton, Honea Path, Iva, Pelzer, Autun,
and Williamston each financing a mill of their own. This was the trend across these four counties –
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each featured a regional powerhouse in Anderson, Greenville, Spartanburg, and Rock Hill that led
the way for a host of small towns, whether towns that had a mill or towns built because of a mill.
As Figure 17 indicates, each of these counties has seen impressive growth rates over the past
century, often substantially above the state average. Out of the three groupings, these counties paced
their neighbors, growing by an average of 16.2% every decade since 1900. At an astounding 37.3%
population growth from 2000-2010, York County has become one of the fastest growing regions in
the entire nation. Rates of growth spiked around 1980 and slowed over the next decade,
corresponding to trends in the overall state. Spartanburg County, the host of Inman Mills and the
Milliken Manufacturing headquarters, currently represents one third of the textile jobs in the
Piedmont, staking its claim as the rallying point of the industry both in the state and country.
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Grouping #2 is composed of those five counties whose manufacturing dependency on
textiles and population is wedged between the other two groupings. With the exception of
Newberry, who had the lowest population in 1960 and only surpasses Union and Chester today, this
grouping could also be considered the mid-range population counties. From 1960 onwards, Pickens
was the fourth most populous among the thirteen counties at an average population of 84,962, with
Greenwood and Laurens representing the next two slots in the rankings.
From 1950 until 1980, Pickens County saw one of the largest growth spurts in South
Carolina history, reaching a peak growth rate at 35% from the previous decade in 1980. Much of this
is due to rapid growth in Clemson University, which expanded its student body by 458% from 1950
to 1990, until slowing markedly after that year.108 On the other side, Newberry County saw a steady
decrease in population starting in 1930, a trend which only began to change forty years later. Overall,
whereas Grouping #1 saw population growth at 1.6% a year from 1900 – 2010, Grouping #2 grew
by 0.92% annually.
The dependency on textiles ranged from Pickens County at 68.3% to Greenwood at 83.9%.
In terms of this variable, there is little difference between these counties and Grouping #1. None of
these quite approaches the dependency level of Grouping #3, and this differentiation is reflected in
the upcoming economic vigor analysis.

“Clemson University: Historical Enrollment at a Glance: 1900 - 2010,” Clemson University, accessed April 5,
2021, https://www.clemson.edu/institutional-effectiveness/documents/oir/historical/Historical-Enrollment-Detail.pdf.
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Rates of Population Growth - County Grouping #3
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Finally, Grouping #3 represents those four counties that were most dependent on the textile
and apparel industry in 1960. Union County led the way with 90.2% of manufacturing jobs in the
textile industry, with Chester close behind at 89.6%, Lancaster at 88.2%, and Cherokee at 86.5%.
The modern American mind has few examples of this level of complete economic dependency upon
a single sector. As individual firms expanded – but mostly contracted – over this time frame at
varying intervals and with different scopes, these four counties did not remain at the top of the
leaderboard, but even apart from their noteworthy dependency levels in 1960, they have several
aspects in common. For one, they were conjoining counties, sharing borders with each other and
ringing what is now the Charlotte MSA. They shared two key rivers that flanked Chester County, the
Broad River to the west and Wylie’s beloved Catawba River to the east, both of which were
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extensively utilized for hydropower. Lancaster and Union were home to two of the largest mills in
the state, employing a combined 2,750 workers as early as 1907.109
If not prosperity, the time of the mills was an era of stability for these historically poor and
largely agricultural counties. When the national unemployment stood at 5.5% in 1960, these four
counties relished their average rate of 4.5%. Though steady, the mills had their limitations in
propagating broad-scale economic renewal. In 1970, the poverty rate of the South stood at 18.5%,
while these four counties averaged 20%. The combined population growth rate of these four
counties was 0.59%, by far the lowest out of the three groupings, with Union and Chester counties
having the slowest growth and, as reaching until 2010, the lowest median household income out of
all Piedmont counties.
Although the individual economic state of these counties certainly differed over this time
span, one factor remained constant. Less and less jobs were available to work with cotton and with
cloth. Ironically, this represented a positive feedback loop. As the textile and apparel industry fled
the region in the late 20th century, fewer and fewer workers had the specialized skills needed to fill
increasingly advanced positions. Long gone are the rote days of doffers and carders. Ellis Fisher of
Inman Mills recently observed that the biggest challenge his mills face is finding the skilled labor to
operate and repair complex textile machinery. “The labor pool has collapsed over the past twenty
years,” he regrets. “As both the supplier pool and labor pool have gotten a lot shallower, so the
ability to innovate and advance has been restricted. This impedes the effort to build back the cluster
through innovation - but we’re doing our best.”110
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Hypothesis
HA : A county-level historical reliance upon the textile and apparel industries for manufacturing jobs
is correlated with a relatively poor modern and current standard of living, measured since the
collapse of the aforementioned industries.
Data
Attempting to quantify as ethereal a concept as “standard of living” is an imposing one.
Quantifying the incalculable is, however, the prized and no doubt envied purview of economics
among the sciences.
Unless specifically cited otherwise, all demographic data listed in this paper was drawn
directly from the decennial United States Census. The other primary sources were the United States
Economic Census (known as the Census of Manufactures before 1992), the Annual Survey of
Manufactures, and the American Community Survey.
Data for this analysis was drawn at a county level, not at a town level. There are three
primary reasons for this. Firstly, although textile mills and apparel companies often located in an
existing city, they just as often chose to establish themselves on the outskirts or even to build a
clapboard-house town of their own. For those early mills that used waterwheels as power, this was
driven by a need to build beside a river; for others, cheap or available land was the draw. Secondly,
the economic impact of even urban mills extended beyond a mere town, whether through direct,
indirect or induced economic multiplier effect. Finally, key economic data for individual cities is
limited in census data after 1970, and small towns are often excluded entirely. Counties, therefore,
are the sole and sufficient option.
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In 1960, 86.1% of all workers in South Carolina lived in the same county as their job. For
the textile industry, this statistic was certainly far higher, given the tendency of mill workers to live
directly adjacent to the mills. Given that, we can assign county-level statistics to a county alone with
reasonable accuracy.
On that note, 1960 was the year chosen for the beginning of this analysis. This selection was
one grounded in historical cause; this was the year when the textile industry in South Carolina can be
considered to be at its peak. Although manufacturing dependency was higher in the early years of
the 20th century, and although employment figures for several counties rose slightly, this was the
decade of the start of foreign competition – competition that, by 1970, was already stunting the
growth and sniping at the sales of the industry.
The end data varies by factor between 2010 – 2019, with this lack of uniformity predicated
both by data availability and intention. This varying allows a discounting of the lingering effects of
the 2008 recession, as some variables are explicitly targeted at 2010 to measure economic resiliency
and staying power. The decade of the 2010’s swung the full length of the economic pendulum - by
spreading the data throughout this time range, a more comprehensive analysis can be conducted.
To establish a realistic and sufficient measure of economic and social health – a combination
that I have termed “economic vigor” – this analysis has selected seven key variables. Each of these
factors is relevant and crucial to understanding county-level health. As this is a historical analysis,
four of the seven deal directly with percentage change over the selected time span of 1960 – current
day, and three solely cover the current state of counties. A balance is thus struck between
proportional economic change over this time span and the modern situation.
Finally, these factors do not directly measure the output of the county, textile or otherwise.
Instead, they cover the health, the strength, and the livability of the county – top to bottom. The top
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of the socioeconomic strata is measured by factors such as the rise in high-output professionals and
the percentage of adults who have an advanced level of education; the middle is covered by the
change in median household income and the percentage change in population; and the bottom is
represented by the poverty and unemployment levels and the percentage on food stamps. No town
can be healthy when any of these levels is declining; this data representation seeks to capture that.
A county that scores highly across these factors is one with an engaged and educated
workforce, widespread prosperity, innovation in business, only a small impoverished population, and
net immigration from socially mobile people who see these facts and want to live there.
Furthermore, it has improved in these areas over the past sixty years. It is, in other words, a region
of economic vigor.
Indicator Factors of Economic and Social Health
1. Rise of the Creative Class (coded as “creative”): Selected in accordance with urban theorist
Richard Florida’s theory on the subject, this figure measures the simple increase or decrease
in certain professions that Florida argues are central to economic development. Data was
drawn from the Economic Research Service (ERS), and was calculated from 1990, the first
year of the data, until a pooled value for 2007-2011, the last figure.

As defined by the ERS, the creative class consists of thirty employment categories, covering
the fields of business management, finance, computer science, mathematics, architecture,
engineering, the life and social sciences, legal operations, education and training, art, sales,
art, design, communications, entertainment, and media.
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Florida explains that this statistic is not just a replication of the higher-education percentage,
but measures “the work people actually do. The creative class is not just a proxy measure for
college graduates…four in ten members of the creative class [in America] do not have
college degrees.”111

2. Population Growth (“popgrowth”): This key variable measures the percentage change in
population from 1960 to 2019. Migration into particular towns is one of the most stalwart
indicators of the economic opportunities there, as incoming residents estimate that the
wages and quality of life outweigh their current town, even when relocation costs are added
into the equation. This statistic takes the state of the county at the height of the textile
industry into account, placing all counties on the level playing field of percentage increase or
decrease.

3. Poverty (“poverty”): The percentage that current (2019) poverty levels represent of 1960
poverty levels. One of the prime figures for measuring the comprehensive health of the
economy, poverty levels are particularly revealing for the textile industry, as the demographic
most affected by the sector collapse is the lower to middle class that made up the bulk of
manufacturing jobs. Thus, this is a measure also of the existence and adequacy of textile
replacements.

111 Richard Florida, “What Critics Get Wrong About the Creative Class and Economic Development,”
Bloomberg CityLab, July 3, 2012, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-07-03/what-critics-get-wrong-aboutthe-creative-class-and-economic-development.
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4. Median Household Income (“mhi”): The simple increase in median household income
from 1960 to 2010. As all data points are taken in the same years, inflation is implicit in the
equation.

5. Levels of Higher Education (“education”): This factor measures the percentage of adults
with at least a bachelor’s degree, pooled over the years 2015-2019.

6. Unemployment (“unemployment”): The second of the three current statistics. Calculated as
U3 in 2019, this statistic measures the percentage of residents who are jobless but have
sought work within the past four weeks and are available to take a job. Because of this
definition, it excludes the chronically unemployed, a demographic key to the societal health
of a region and captured in the following factor.

7. Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Dependency (“snap”): Addition of the
SNAP variable measures the percentage of the county’s population receiving SNAP benefits
in 2010. By including this variable, and in this specific year, the core strength of the economy
is measured. Recessions test the mettle and strength of companies across all sectors, and a
large portion of your citizens relying upon the federal government for living assistance,
especially during a recession, is a sign of fundamental weakness. In South Carolina, the
income threshold for SNAP benefits is 130% of the federal poverty level; 45% of SNAP
recipients are children, with nearly 30% of recipients being 55 years or older.112 This factor,

“SNAP,” South Carolina Department of Social Services, accessed March 28, 2021, https://dss.sc.gov/assistanceprograms/snap/.
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then, also measures the wellness of two demographics that might not be included in
workforce data.
The primary independent variable for this study is the Manufacturing Dependency on
Textiles (“textile”): the percentage of the manufacturing workforce employed by the textile industry
in 1960. This factor measures the relative dominance that this sector had on the manufacturing of a
county.
This particular statistic is chosen because of the economic primacy of manufacturing. Out of
what can be considered the three major sectors of the economy – agriculture, manufacturing,
services – manufacturing “provides high-wage jobs, especially for workers who would otherwise
earn the lowest wages, is the major source of commercial innovation, can make a major source of
commercial contribution to reducing the nation’s trade deficit, and makes a disproportionately large
contribution to environmental sustainability.”113 Specifically relevant is the first point – economic
opportunity to less-educated workers. This was the initial selling point for the original textile mills,
and existence of such jobs is still critical for modern economies to be successful. Apart from the
prominent economic multiplier and trickle-down effects of the sector, manufacturing jobs average a
19.9% higher salary than all non-manufacturing jobs.114
In order to more comprehensively study the impact of the decline of the textile industry
beyond simply the South Carolina cluster, forty-seven other Southern counties were analyzed on
these factors. When included with the thirteen South Carolina counties, the full dataset then comes

113 Susan Helper, Timothy Krueger, and Howard Wial, “Why Does Manufacturing Matter?”, Brookings Institute,
Feb. 2012, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0222_manufacturing_helper_krueger_ wial.pdf,
2.
114 Helper et al., “Manufacturing,” 4.
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out to sixty counties, thirty of which were economically dependent ( > 65% manufacturing
dependency on textiles) and thirty of which were not dependent (< 35% dependency). These
counties were chosen primarily from the three other states that constituted the bulk of the Southern
textile industry – North Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama – with a select few other counties selected
from neighboring Southern states of Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, and Louisiana. Textile
counties were selected primarily from the Piedmont region of the four critical states.
Two criteria were considered in this selection of the forty-seven other counties. First, these
counties were chosen to give a full approximation of population ranges in 1960, in order to
approximate the size proportions of the South Carolina dataset. For instance, though two of the
thirteen counties in the South Carolina study (Greenville and Spartanburg) can be classified as large
and two (Anderson and York) as mid-sized, this ratio does not hold true across the Piedmont South.
Proportionally more large counties were thus favored to simulate this ratio, hence the specific
inclusion of select large counties from neighboring states. Secondly, counties were chosen to give an
equal representation to textile independence and reliance to evaluate the criteria more effectively.
Beyond those two qualifications, counties were selected randomly.
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Figure 19

As demonstrated in Figure 18, the distribution of the mean of scores by state is similar,
certainly when standard error ranges are taken into account. Two obvious outliers present
themselves: Columbia County (10.14) and Paulding County (10.12), both of Georgia.
Georgia is a highly representative state, both nationally and internationally, because of the
degree of urbanization and resulting centralization of wealth that has occurred in recent decades.
This growth is typified by Atlanta, the largest city in the Deep South and one of the top MSA’s in
the nation. One of these two outliers, Paulding County, is located on the northwestern outskirts of
Atlanta. As with Columbia County, it was a moderately textile-dependent town in 1960, with a
manufacturing reliance score of 37.9%. Since that time, it has been subjected – or perhaps treated –
to the insatiable sprawl of Atlanta. Developed land in Paulding has increased by 594% from 1982 to
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2015.115 Out of the sixty counties examined, Paulding made the largest population increase,
bounding from a rural community of 13,101 people in 1960 to over 142,000 citizens today. Similarly,
Columbia County is located adjacent to another flourishing city, Augusta, and was an outlier by the
increase in median household income, having one of the highest values in the state at $84,549. It has
also experienced a correlated population boom in recent years that has revitalized the formerly
textile-heavy town.
The scores of these two counties have been included for three reasons. First, they were
selected in the randomized process. Second, they serve as representative to the disparate economic
and population growth that has occurred in certain counties around the South. The evolution of
these two counties is far from limited to them, but is happening around the outskirts of metropolises
in neighboring states. Although not quite to the same extent, York County in South Carolina and
Gaston and Cabarrus Counties in North Carolina have seen similar trends. Third, their inclusion did
not alter the primary regression analysis, which was run both with and without them to the same
conclusion.
Method
In order to evaluate the cumulative effect of the factors, I utilized a data standardization
method with the following equation:

115 Everett Catts, “Consultant: Metro Atlanta’s Urban Sprawl should Raise Concerns for All,” The Neighbor
(Roswell, Georgia),, Aug. 14, 2020, https://www.mdjonline.com/neighbor_newspapers/consultant-metro-atlanta-surban-sprawl-should-raise-concerns-for-all/article_1db5da18-de5b-11ea-b8d1-076143962fc2.html.
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y = transformed variable

y=

("– "%&')
)*'+,

x = data point
xmin = minimum data point out of the full dataset
range = max – min of the full dataset

This process yields a uniform scale for each of the data points by county, converting them
into a standardized decimal between 0 and 1. Then, by adding each standardized point by county, a
cumulative score of equally weighted variables is achieved that enables comparative analysis.
Transforming the data in this way allowed for simple linear regressions to be run, with
“score” as the dependent variable (y) and “textile” as the independent variable (x). Five such
regressions were calculated: the entire dataset of Southern counties, and individual regressions for
the selected counties in North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama. Unless specified
otherwise, the regression equation for all regression analyses is: Yi=β0 + β1Xi + ui .
Results
Although multiple regressions with interaction of the variables were also calculated, the
compilation of the seven economic vigor indicators into a single score allows for a simple linear
regression, which is preferable for its comprehensiveness and eponymous simplicity. First, all sixty
Southern counties in the dataset were analyzed in this way.
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Figure 20

The result? There is insufficient evidence to overturn the null hypothesis of no difference. In
other words, we cannot conclude, in the South at least, that a historical dependency on textile
manufacturing has resulted in a relatively worse economic vigor.
Introduction of a dummy variable for textile dependency > 70% did not change the
conclusion, with both a low (and positive!) slope estimate and an outrageously high p-value.
Analyzing the score against a dummy variable for size of the town gave the same result, as did
multiple regressions that sought to capture any interaction between either real size or textile
dependency, or the dummy variables of the same. The same regression test was also calculated for
only the textile dependent counties in each state. In none of these tests was the significance level
close to being met.
In light of the lack of a trend identified in the entire dataset, the base regression (“score ~
textile”) was performed for the Alabama (12 counties), Georgia (16 counties), and North Carolina
(14 counties) datasets. Each of these states gave a similar result to the overall trend, conclusively
failing to overturn the null hypothesis. Key outcomes of this regression are listed below.
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Estimate
Slope Estimate
Residual Standard Error
Adj. R-sq.
P-Value

Alabama
0.3729
1.241
-0.09651
0.8619

Georgia
0.4155
2.878
-0.06986
0.8881

North Carolina
0.2075
1.009
-0.08082
0.8701

Figure 21

When South Carolina was analyzed in this way, however, a highly statistically significant and
fascinating conclusion is reached: our hypothesis (HA) is found to be true. The result of the simple
linear regression, as seen in Figure 21 below, relays that the economic vigor score for the thirteen
analyzed Piedmont counties drops by 1.15 (out of 7 possible points) for every 10% increase in job
dependency on textiles. Moreover, the textile dependency factor easily meets the required
significance level, and the adjusted R2 indicates that 34.79% of variation in the data is explained by
the “textile” variable, a relatively high rate for such a complex model.

Figure 22
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In a dataset as small as this one – only thirteen textile-dependent counties in a particular
region in a particular state – the question of causality can be difficult to ascertain. Although there is
an identifiable trend, the economic performance of only a few counties can sway the entire result.

Figure 23

Cook’s distance is an econometric test that identifies which variables are most important to
the regression conclusion; in this case, which counties were most crucial to the hypothesis being
verified. In descending order, the top three counties that this test identified are: Pickens (0.4), York
(0.32), and Chester (0.14). Pickens, the dot to the far left of Figure 23, provides the crucial result of a
relatively small textile base that has seen a moderately high level of economic growth, while Chester
represents the other end of the spectrum, with the lowest score of all thirteen counties and a heavy
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historical dependence on textiles. York has the largest residual out of all counties and ranked in the
top three scores out of the sixty counties examined.
The adjoining counties of Chester and Union can be seen in the bottom righthand corner of
Figure 22. Without their inclusion in the data, the regression trend becomes statistically insignificant,
although still existent, with a p-value of 0.2871 and the R2 plummeting to 0.027.
Analysis
In summary, the hypothesis (historical reliance on textiles results in a poor modern situation)
was proven false for the entire dataset of Southern counties. It was, however, true for the South
Carolina Piedmont. Moreover, the significance of the regression was dependent on a few select
counties.
Economic Vigor Score - SC Piedmont Counties
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The above graph, simply showing the scores of the South Carolina counties, yields several
interesting insights. Firstly, County Grouping #1 (the larger counties) are all in the top half of the
results, with York and Greenville occupying the top two spots. Conversely, three of the counties in
Grouping #3 (smaller, textile-dependent) occupy the last three spots.
This begs the question – is size the only predictor of economic resiliency through
globalization? It is common knowledge that larger American cities have grown at faster rates than
smaller ones over the past century. Is the simple population advantage, then, why York is better off
than Chester? The data does show a correlation. For these South Carolina counties, every additional
10,000 residents of a county bring a $438 increase in the median household income change, a
decrease in unemployment of -0.02, and an increase of 0.065 in the economic vigor score. Each
result is statistically significant.
Moreover, this finding can be extrapolated. The entire dataset of Southern counties was
analyzed by the driving distance from the county seat to one of the top five cities in their respective
states. Counties that contain such a city, such as Greenville, were removed. Albeit with a low R2 of
0.102, a statistically significant correlation exists here as well. For every additional mile removed
from a regional metropolis, the economic vigor score of counties decreased by –0.032. This finding,
although helpful to have in mind, is a well-known one in the field of economic development.
Anthony Tang, in his brilliant 1958 treatise on economic development in the Piedmont, writes that
rural counties “favorably situated in relation to major centers of economic development have
encountered relatively few difficulties in adjusting their agriculture to changing conditions.”116
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Further, it is the “remote, underdeveloped farm areas, already the victim of economic development,
[that] seldom find themselves in a position to participate fully in general technological
advancement.”117
Population size, therefore, does play a role in predicting the socioeconomic health of
counties. It does not explain why South Carolina was the only state examined that had this strong
trend. Through examining the residuals and Cook’s Distances of the regression, another narrative is
more likely.
The Piedmont region of the South, historically an impoverished region reliant on cotton,
received the bulk of textile investment in the late 19th and early 20th century largely because of that
cotton production, their proximity to bountiful flowing water, and the presence of a few local
inventors and financiers who recognized the opportunity and poured capital into infrastructure and
innovation. The textile cluster radiated outward from Spartanburg, Greenville, and Anderson
counties, the three largest in the region as early as 1890. Smaller counties eagerly embraced the
textile opportunity as well. Larger counties, however, soon began to diversify their manufacturing
base, while smaller ones clung to the stability of textiles until it was too late to change. Furthermore,
if a county was a historical population hub (Grouping #1) or had a major educational institution
(Pickens), then their current situation was given a boost relative to surrounding counties.
Economic Development Strategies
Though more prolific and targeted now, economic development incentives are not new to
South Carolina. In 1880, one state report describes an industrial incentive that now would be
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unspeakably radical: a ten-year exemption from taxation on all new machinery in textile plants.118
This law was a “great inducement to the establishment of new factories,” stated a textile executive of
that day; but, as normally occurs with such exemptions, it served to place South Carolina on a level
footing with neighboring states instead of representing a distinct competitive advantage.119
On a county level, all relied on the textile industry, and grew in correlation with it. However,
some counties clung to this dependence longer, and others began aggressively pursuing varied
economic development sooner. A fitting analogy, perhaps, is the cultivation of cotton. Although
each of these counties had prime conditions for growing cotton, external pressures began to wrack
the industry. Pests came in increasing numbers, foreign competition arose, domestic demand
wavered, and the soil began to grow exhausted of nutrients. Some counties, recognizing this either
consciously or otherwise, began diversifying their farming with peaches or beef; others stubbornly
clung to cotton and the processing thereof, ramping up spending on investment in a myopic
determination to hold on to the glory days. It is both a metaphor and a reality: for some, their
manufacturing strategy merely mimicked their agricultural know-how.
In 1990, nearly 66% of the manufacturing workforce of Union County had a job in textiles.
Cherokee and Chester were close behind, at roughly 57% apiece. Pickens was at 54%. Imports were
already beginning to chip away at market share, but new capital investment figures for Pickens
County were $31.6 million in the 1990 census, while Chester County was at $31 million and
Cherokee at $28.3 million. Each of these figures by these little counties was higher than the new
investment by Greenville, the county with the most textile businesses in the state.
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This strategy was not uniform across counties, however. By the 1990 census, Newberry
County had reduced its textile reliance to 33% of its workforce. This diversification was timely, as
over the next decade, their two remaining textile mills would both leave, and the number of apparel
firms would drop by half. Despite this disappearance of the mill industry, Newberry’s manufacturing
workforce only dropped by a mere 11% from 1970 to 2010; by far the best among the South
Carolina counties examined. By comparison, Lancaster County lost 83% of her manufacturing
workforce over this time span, Union County lost 77%, and Chester County lost 64%. Figure 1
illustrates this change in the manufacturing workforce over this time span.
In Newberry’s case, the county diversified its manufacturing primarily through attracting a
diverse mixture of outside firms, both national and international. Even since the 2010 census,
Newberry has improved further with the successful location of a Samsung home appliance
manufacturing facility in 2017, a $350 million investment that employs 1,200 workers. Samsung cited
Newberry’s “high-skilled workforce, robust supply chain and transportation infrastructure and
commitment to public-private partnerships” as the key reasons for the site selection.120 The county
also boasts the largest Kraft-Heinz turkey processing facility in the nation in the Louis Rich plant,
which employs 1,500 workers and has expanded over the years.121 Other major manufacturers
include Valmont Composite (headquartered in Nebraska: fiberglass poles), MacLean Power Systems
(headquartered in Illinois: power systems products), and Kiswire Inc. (headquartered in South
Korea; steel cord for automobile tires).122 Smaller manufacturers have chosen Newberry as well,
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including Falcon Boats – a South Carolina-based manufacturer of fishing boats that moved to
Newberry in 2016 and employs 35 workers.123
Newberry was not the only county to diversify her manufacturing in this way. The tri-county
swath of Greenville, Spartanburg, and Cherokee have emerged from the textile collapse with a
combined 72% of their manufacturing jobs retained. As “key members of the Spartanburg business
elite” began to realize in the 1960s that textile tariffs would not be maintained, they developed a
plan: “if they couldn’t fight the internationalism, maybe they should try to use it to their
advantage.”124 As with the early textile boosters seventy years before, Spartanburg leaders pitched
cheap land, energy, and water in the Piedmont region of the state. And, unlike early textile mills,
incoming foreign direct investment (FDI) would have access to a large workforce highly skilled in
manufacturing and machinery. Spartanburg’s Chamber of Commerce and community leaders “threw
themselves with almost obsessive determination into the slowly awakening competition for foreign
investors,” and the flow of companies began: Hoechst, Michelin, Rhone-Poulenc, Ciba Geigy,
Saxonia-Francke, Eltex, and a host of others from France, Sweden, Switzerland, and more.125
Anderson and York began to share in the blessings: notably, in 1985, Bosch opened an automobile
sensor plant in Anderson County. The entire region began to acquire a reputation as an emerging
automobile cluster, rippling out from the aggressive leadership of Spartanburg, and the entire state
began to adopt the industrial recruitment strategy of Spartanburg’s leaders. “No southern state,”

123 “Falcon Boats Establishing Newberry County Operations,” South Carolina Department of Commerce, March 24,
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lauds historian James Cobb, “proved more successful at attracting foreign plants than South
Carolina.”126
The 1992 decision of BMW to locate in Greer, on the border of Greenville and Spartanburg
counties, remains the crown jewel in the diadem of the South Carolina economic development
history. BMW listed the following reasons as key for their location decision: a history of
manufacturing and the resulting work ethic, the strong technical education system, attractive
incentives, access to the nearby inland port and airport, low costs, and confidence in the local and
state leadership.127 Since opening their Greer plant, BMW has invested over $8 billion in capital and
facilities. Currently, they directly employ over 10,000 workers, and have created a horde of supplier
and supporting industries.128
As the textile industry has collapsed, however, leaders in low-performing counties have not
merely accepted the slide. Their primary response has been mimicking the “Spartanburg strategy” of
the 1980s. This includes both foreign direct investment and luring other manufacturers to the
county through the use of speculative buildings and incentives. The quest has not been in vain: from
2003-2017, South Carolina led the nation in the location quotient of foreign direct investment.129
Union County, for instance, currently features five zoned industrial parks. Their County Plan
focuses on two main categories: workforce training and infrastructure development. The former
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includes improving bureaucratic efficiency, expanding participation in technical education, and, most
aggressively, a plan to “actively market job opportunities in Union County” to “U.S. regions with
lower levels of economic development activity.”130 On the infrastructure side, specific plans include
increasing broadband access, developing water and sewer capabilities, and widening the primary
connecting highway to I-26. Dr. Allan Charles, the preeminent historian of Union County, states
that “every chamber of commerce knows the path you have to take to grow: you have to be hunting
industry and building spec buildings.”131 The impact of globalization, he concurred, have hit the
more textile-dependent counties the hardest. And although they have filled the gap somewhat, “the
new jobs that have moved in pay a whole lot more [than textiles], but there are not as many of
them.”132
Chester County attempted to immediately fill the mill vacancies with similar businesses,
often in the empty mill buildings. In 1983, one of the three mills in Great Falls, on the Catawba
River, was sold to Flextronics Southeast – an electronics company based out of California. Another
Great Falls mill traded hands a few times, settling on an art distributor in 1990. In 1998, another
mill in Chester proper was sold to a picture-framing business.133
Raw numbers do not tell the whole story, however. Especially in smaller counties,
manufacturers are increasingly locating in specially-zoned industrial parks outside of cities and near
major highways or railways. This strategy might be cost-effective, but it represents a migration of
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jobs from the city center outward. The center of the town, and resulting community spirit, has
suffered. “The textile industry leaving slowed the growth of the community,” reflects Harold
Thompson, the mayor of Union.134 A walk down Main Street in Union confirms the economic
consequence of this change. A full 35% of storefronts in the center of town are empty. In other
similar towns – the county seats of largely rural counties – Main Street closure is even higher.
Chester, for instance, lacks the benefit of a college in the middle of town that brings in over a
thousand students, as USC-Union does.
Economic development efforts, then, are well and good, preventing the economy of these
counties from implosion. Yet the path forward is certainly difficult. As Allan Charles points out,
“the economic development we’re doing is competitive - there are over three thousand counties in
the U.S. and at least half of them are in the business of recruiting new industry.”135 And the victories
are relative. Union’s top private sector employers are Gestamp (Spain: auto stamping), Dollar
General (distribution), Belk (distribution), and Timken (Ohio: roller bearings). Milliken, a
Spartanburg-based textile manufacturer, also operates two large plants in Union County that employ
a total of 338 workers. Although these have somewhat filled the gap left by textiles, the
manufacturing workforce of Union has dropped by 72% since 1980. New jobs have come in, but
they have been a net loser from the globalization of textiles, and the largest new employers are either
satellites of the BMW automobile cluster or distribution, simply moving products around instead of
creating them. And yet, even though they are relatively close to Spartanburg, the ripple effects of the
automobile cluster have not benefited Union as much.
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Take a county like York, on the other hand. Top employers of that county include
healthcare, financial services, telecommunications, and nuclear power generation. While York also
has distribution centers (Ross, U.S. Foods, Black and Decker), their workforce is far more varied
and advanced, representing high-wage jobs that similarly attract highly educated workers.136 Similarly,
Anderson County has prioritized a diverse manufacturing sector, stating that “for a county to grow
their base economy, industries that generate wealth from beyond county lines such as
manufacturing, finance, technology, etc., must be actively facilitated and recruited.”137 Why these
jobs particularly? The answer lies in stability, the cluster effect of manufacturing, and the
opportunities for workers. Out of the top fifteen economic sectors in Anderson County, durable
and non-durable manufacturing pay the highest weekly wage, at $911 and $820, respectively. In
comparison with less developed counties, Anderson boasts fifty-one foreign firms, indicating that
this manufacturing recruitment strategy has been far from a short-term endeavor.
Conclusion
When analyzing history, it is human nature to assign blame to specific causes. In this case,
the impact of globalization – the opening up of the American textile industry to cheap foreign
competition – has been the control treatment applied equally to the entire nation. Clearly, however,
the end result has not been equal across the board. This disparity cannot merely be attributed to a
few individual business or political leaders, as the thirteen-county trend rejects that assumption.
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Thus, it is tempting to assign causation to correlation, naively stating that over-reliance on
textiles was the sole and primary cause for the economic struggles; and extending that statement to
posit, boldly, that manufacturing dependency on any single industry will inexorably lead to
socioeconomic decline at some point. The data is not sufficiently conclusive to make this claim.
What the data does support, though, is that this trend can occur, especially when textile dependency
is triangulated with lack of a higher education institution and distance from a regional metropolis.
All else being equal, in this particular region that is fairly representative, strengthening the
manufacturing base of counties through diversification is an indicator of health. All else being equal,
therefore, why would other regions not want to copy a successful model?
Critics might respond that this is an extreme or obsolete example. Rarely, they say, does an
entire county depend so heavily on a single industry, and rarely does international competition
accelerate as quickly as that of textiles and apparel did. And although in one sense they might be
right – few counties today have 90% of their jobs in a single industry, as Chester and Union did in
1960 – in another sense, these arguments are short-sighted. What would happen to the South
Carolina automobile cluster if BMW up and left? Or, more tangibly, what would become of the rural
towns of Nebraska and Iowa if China cut off soybean purchases? The correlation between economic
independence and economic development strategies, in other words, is not limited to the Piedmont
of South Carolina. Texas, for example, took a similar path in the 1980s, when foreign oil volatility
“forced the state to diversify away from the [oil] industry. As a result…Texas has never been better
positioned to withstand production cuts.”138
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The good news is that the window for socioeconomic improvement has not closed for these
counties, and that the path towards a greater economic vigor is increasingly visible. Over the past ten
years, economic development efforts have accelerated in many of these smaller counties, as they
attempt to replicate the foreign direct investment and luring of domestic manufactures that
successfully diversified Spartanburg, Greenville and the like in the 1980s. Are Chester, Union,
Laurens and the like behind the curve by a decade or two? Possibly. Yet the opportunity is present
and bright for those who would seize it.
Disparity or a losing performance in the past must not result in present despondency or
resignation. Charting an economic path to prosperity will require creativity, tireless energy, vigorous
leadership, and a local ethic of hard work, education, and entrepreneurship. If history tells us
anything, it is that this combination can far outstrip the prejudice of nature or the whims of
politicians. It is the challenge of towns, then, to meet this standard.
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